Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments. z-Tree is a widely used software package for developing and carrying out economic experiments. The language used to define the experiments is simple and compact, meaning that experiments can be developed quickly, and programming experience is not necessary, though useful. z-Tree is flexible both with respect to the logic of interaction and the visual representation, allowing the simple programming of normal form games, extensive form games, double auctions, or clock auctions, for example. We began the development of the software in 1998, and have continually added new features.

References in zbMATH (referenced in 282 articles )

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  1. Gamba, Astrid; Manzoni, Elena; Stanca, Luca: Social comparison and risk taking behavior (2017)
  2. Kocher, Martin G.; Poulsen, Odile; Zizzo, Daniel J.: Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining (2017)
  3. Krawczyk, Michal W.; Trautmann, Stefan T.; van de Kuilen, Gijs: Catastrophic risk: social influences on insurance decisions (2017)
  4. Liu, Jia; Riyanto, Yohanes E.: Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study (2017)
  5. Anauati, María Victoria; Feld, Brian; Galiani, Sebastian; Torrens, Gustavo: Collective action: experimental evidence (2016)
  6. Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick: An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence (2016)
  7. Bayer, Ralph-Christopher: Cooperation and distributive conflict (2016)
  8. Becker-Peth, Michael; Thonemann, Ulrich W.: Reference points in revenue sharing contracts -- how to design optimal supply chain contracts (2016)
  9. Bolton, Gary E.; Karagözoğlu, Emin: On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims (2016)
  10. Breinbjerg, Jesper; Sebald, Alexander; Østerdal, Lars Peter: Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence (2016)
  11. Brown, Alexander L.; Velez, Rodrigo A.: The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems (2016)
  12. Camerer, Colin; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R.: Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions (2016)
  13. Cardella, Eric: Exploiting the guilt aversion of others: do agents do it and is it effective? (2016)
  14. Castillo, Marco; Dianat, Ahrash: Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment (2016)
  15. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Ramer, Roald; Schram, Arthur: Formal versus informal legislative bargaining (2016)
  16. Di Cagno, D.; Galliera, A.; Güth, W.; Pace, N.; Panaccione, L.: Make-up and suspicion in bargaining with cheap talk: an experiment controlling for gender and gender constellation (2016)
  17. Ellwardt, Lea; Hernández, Penélope; Martínez-Cánovas, Guillem; Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel: Conflict and segregation in networks: an experiment on the interplay between individual preferences and social influence (2016)
  18. Greiff, Matthias; Paetzel, Fabian: Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations -- an experimental study (2016)
  19. Großer, Jens; Seebauer, Michael: The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study (2016)
  20. Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Jacquemet, Nicolas; Luchini, Stéphane; Zylbersztejn, Adam: Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty (2016)

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