Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments. z-Tree is a widely used software package for developing and carrying out economic experiments. The language used to define the experiments is simple and compact, meaning that experiments can be developed quickly, and programming experience is not necessary, though useful. z-Tree is flexible both with respect to the logic of interaction and the visual representation, allowing the simple programming of normal form games, extensive form games, double auctions, or clock auctions, for example. We began the development of the software in 1998, and have continually added new features.

References in zbMATH (referenced in 302 articles )

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  1. Arechar, Antonio A.; Dreber, Anna; Fudenberg, Drew; Rand, David G.: “I’m just a soul whose intentions are good”: the role of communication in noisy repeated games (2017)
  2. Bracha, Anat; Vesterlund, Lise: Mixed signals: charity reporting when donations signal generosity and income (2017)
  3. Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Meloso, Debrah; Miller, Luis: Strategic risk and response time across games (2017)
  4. Duffy, John; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung: Coordination via correlation: an experimental study (2017)
  5. Gamba, Astrid; Manzoni, Elena; Stanca, Luca: Social comparison and risk taking behavior (2017)
  6. Kocher, Martin G.; Poulsen, Odile; Zizzo, Daniel J.: Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining (2017)
  7. Krawczyk, Michal W.; Trautmann, Stefan T.; van de Kuilen, Gijs: Catastrophic risk: social influences on insurance decisions (2017)
  8. Kusterer, David J.; Schmitz, Patrick W.: The management of innovation: experimental evidence (2017)
  9. Liu, Jia; Riyanto, Yohanes E.: Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study (2017)
  10. Maas, Alexander; Goemans, Christopher; Manning, Dale; Kroll, Stephan; Brown, Thomas: Dilemmas, coordination and defection: how uncertain tipping points induce common pool resource destruction (2017)
  11. Mengel, Friederike; Rivas, Javier: Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments (2017)
  12. Anauati, María Victoria; Feld, Brian; Galiani, Sebastian; Torrens, Gustavo: Collective action: experimental evidence (2016)
  13. Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick: An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence (2016)
  14. Bayer, Ralph-Christopher: Cooperation and distributive conflict (2016)
  15. Becker-Peth, Michael; Thonemann, Ulrich W.: Reference points in revenue sharing contracts -- how to design optimal supply chain contracts (2016)
  16. Bolton, Gary E.; Karagözoğlu, Emin: On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims (2016)
  17. Boyer-Kassem, Thomas; Duch^ene, Sébastien; Guerci, Eric: Quantum-like models cannot account for the conjunction fallacy (2016)
  18. Breinbjerg, Jesper; Sebald, Alexander; Østerdal, Lars Peter: Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence (2016)
  19. Brown, Alexander L.; Velez, Rodrigo A.: The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems (2016)
  20. Camerer, Colin; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R.: Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions (2016)

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