Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments. z-Tree is a widely used software package for developing and carrying out economic experiments. The language used to define the experiments is simple and compact, meaning that experiments can be developed quickly, and programming experience is not necessary, though useful. z-Tree is flexible both with respect to the logic of interaction and the visual representation, allowing the simple programming of normal form games, extensive form games, double auctions, or clock auctions, for example. We began the development of the software in 1998, and have continually added new features.

References in zbMATH (referenced in 366 articles )

Showing results 1 to 20 of 366.
Sorted by year (citations)

1 2 3 ... 17 18 19 next

  1. Aycinena, Diego; Bejarano, Hernán; Rentschler, Lucas: Informed entry in auctions (2018)
  2. Bruner, Justin; O’Connor, Cailin; Rubin, Hannah; Huttegger, Simon M.: David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning (2018)
  3. Ellingsen, Tore; Östling, Robert; Wengström, Erik: How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information? (2018)
  4. Fehr, Dietmar: Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence (2018)
  5. Fonseca, Miguel A.; Peters, Kim: Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust (2018)
  6. Gee, Laura K.; Schreck, Michael J.: Do beliefs about peers matter for donation matching? Experiments in the field and laboratory (2018)
  7. Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Walkowitz, Gari: Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis (2018)
  8. Koch, Christian; Penczynski, Stefan P.: The winner’s curse: conditional reasoning and belief formation (2018)
  9. Liu, Tracy Xiao: All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study (2018)
  10. Miller, Luis; Montero, Maria; Vanberg, Christoph: Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments (2018)
  11. Arechar, Antonio A.; Dreber, Anna; Fudenberg, Drew; Rand, David G.: “I’m just a soul whose intentions are good”: the role of communication in noisy repeated games (2017)
  12. Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander; Suetens, Sigrid: A note on testing guilt aversion (2017)
  13. Benndorf, Volker; Kübler, Dorothea; Normann, Hans-Theo: Depth of reasoning and information revelation: an experiment on the distribution of $k$-levels (2017)
  14. Boosey, Luke; Brookins, Philip; Ryvkin, Dmitry: Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence (2017)
  15. Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol: Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory (2017)
  16. Bouton, Laurent; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Malherbe, Frédéric: Unanimous rules in the laboratory (2017)
  17. Bracha, Anat; Vesterlund, Lise: Mixed signals: charity reporting when donations signal generosity and income (2017)
  18. Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Meloso, Debrah; Miller, Luis: Strategic risk and response time across games (2017)
  19. Cartwright, Edward; Stepanova, Anna: Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game (2017)
  20. Casella, Alessandra; Laslier, Jean-François; Macé, Antonin: Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto’s lieutenants (2017)

1 2 3 ... 17 18 19 next