Practical power analysis attacks on software implementations of McEliece. The McEliece public-key cryptosystem is based on the fact that decoding unknown linear binary codes is an NP-complete problem. The interest on implementing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, e.g. McEliece, on microprocessor-based platforms has been extremely raised due to the increasing storage space of these platforms. Therefore, their vulnerability and robustness against physical attacks, e.g., state-of-the-art power analysis attacks, must be investigated. In this work, we address mainly two power analysis attacks on various implementations of McEliece on an 8-bit AVR microprocessor. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that such side-channel attacks are practically evaluated.
Keywords for this software
References in zbMATH (referenced in 5 articles , 1 standard article )
Showing results 1 to 5 of 5.
- Chen, Cong; Eisenbarth, Thomas; von Maurich, Ingo; Steinwandt, Rainer: Masking large keys in hardware: a masked implementation of McEliece (2016)
- Fabšič, Tomáš; Gallo, Ondrej; Hromada, Viliam: Simple power analysis attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem (2016)
- Chen, Cong; Eisenbarth, Thomas; von Maurich, Ingo; Steinwandt, Rainer: Differential power analysis of a McEliece cryptosystem (2015)
- Couvreur, Alain; Otmani, Ayoub; Tillich, Jean-Pierre: Polynomial time attack on wild McEliece over quadratic extensions (2014)
- Heyse, Stefan; Moradi, Amir; Paar, Christof: Practical power analysis attacks on software implementations of McEliece (2010)