The TAMARIN prover for the symbolic analysis of security protocols. The Tamarin prover supports the automated, unbounded, symbolic analysis of security protocols. It features expressive languages for specifying protocols, adversary models, and properties, and support for efficient deduction and equational reasoning. We provide an overview of the tool and its applications.
Keywords for this software
References in zbMATH (referenced in 12 articles )
Showing results 1 to 12 of 12.
- Durán, Francisco; Eker, Steven; Escobar, Santiago; Martí-Oliet, Narciso; Meseguer, José; Rubio, Rubén; Talcott, Carolyn: Programming and symbolic computation in Maude (2020)
- Li, Di Long; Tiu, Alwen: Combining proverif and automated theorem provers for security protocol verification (2019)
- Baelde, David; Delaune, Stéphanie; Hirschi, Lucca: A reduced semantics for deciding trace equivalence (2017)
- Cheval, Vincent; Comon-Lundh, Hubert; Delaune, Stéphanie: A procedure for deciding symbolic equivalence between sets of constraint systems (2017)
- Delaune, Stéphanie; Hirschi, Lucca: A survey of symbolic methods for establishing equivalence-based properties in cryptographic protocols (2017)
- Kassem, Ali; Falcone, Yliès; Lafourcade, Pascal: Formal analysis and offline monitoring of electronic exams (2017)
- Ölveczky, Peter Csaba: Designing reliable distributed systems. A formal methods approach based on executable modeling in Maude (2017)
- Durán, Francisco; Eker, Steven; Escobar, Santiago; Martí-Oliet, Narciso; Meseguer, José; Talcott, Carolyn: Built-in variant generation and unification, and their applications in maude 2.7 (2016)
- Basin, David; Keller, Michel; Radomirović, Saša; Sasse, Ralf: Alice and Bob meet equational theories (2015)
- Meadows, Catherine: Emerging issues and trends in formal methods in cryptographic protocol analysis: twelve years later (2015)
- Sattarzadeh, Behnam; Fallah, Mehran S.: Automated type-based analysis of injective agreement in the presence of compromised principals (2015)
- Meier, Simon; Schmidt, Benedikt; Cremers, Cas; Basin, David: The TAMARIN prover for the symbolic analysis of security protocols (2013) ioport