The Mist algorithm generates randomly different addition chains for performing a particular exponentiation. This means that power attacks which require averaging over a number of exponentiation power traces becomes impossible. Moreover, attacks which are based on recognising repeated use of the same pre-computed multipliers during an individual exponentiation are also infeasible. The algorithm is particularly well suited to cryptographic functions which depend on exponentiation and which are implemented in embedded systems such as smart cards. It is more efficient than the normal square-and-multiply algorithm and uses less memory than 4-ary exponentiation.

References in zbMATH (referenced in 17 articles , 1 standard article )

Showing results 1 to 17 of 17.
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  1. Walter, Colin D.: A duality in space usage between left-to-right and right-to-left exponentiation (2012)
  2. Mangard, Stefan; Oswald, Elisabeth; Popp, Thomas: Power analysis attacks. Revealing the secrets of smart cards (2007)
  3. Okeya, Katsuyuki; Takagi, Tsuyoshi: Security analysis of CRT-based cryptosystems (2006)
  4. Vuillaume, Camille; Okeya, Katsuyuki: Flexible exponentiation with resistance to side channel attacks (2006)
  5. Lim, Chae Hoon: A new method for securing elliptic scalar multiplication against side-channel attacks (2004)
  6. Sim, Sang Gyoo; Park, Dong Jin; Lee, Pil Joong: New power analysis on the Ha-Moon algorithm and the MIST algorithm (2004)
  7. Walter, Colin D.: Issues of security with the Oswald-Aigner exponentiation algorithm (2004)
  8. Walter, Colin D.: Longer keys may facilitate side channel attacks (2004)
  9. Akishita, Toru; Takagi, Tsuyoshi: Zero-value point attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystem (2003)
  10. Avanzi, Roberto M.: Countermeasures against differential power analysis for hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems. (2003)
  11. Cathalo, Julien; Koeune, François; Quisquater, Jean-Jacques: A new type of timing attack: application to GPS. (2003)
  12. Großschädl, Johann; Kamendje, Guy-Armand: Architectural enhancements for Montgomery multiplication on embedded RISC processors (2003)
  13. Itoh, Kouichi; Izu, Tetsuya; Takenaka, Masahiko: A practical countermeasure against address-bit differential power analysis. (2003)
  14. Okeya, Katsuyuki; Han, Dong-Guk: Side channel attack on ha-moon’s countermeasure of randomized signed scalar multiplication (2003)
  15. Walter, Colin D.: Seeing through MIST given a small fraction of an RSA private key (2003)
  16. Walter, Colin D.: Some security aspects of the MIST randomized exponentiation algorithm (2002)
  17. Walter, Colin D.: MIST: An efficient, randomized exponentiation algorithm for resisting power analysis (2002)