ProVerif
ProVerif is an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier, in the formal model (so called Dolev-Yao model). This protocol verifier is based on a representation of the protocol by Horn clauses. Its main features are: It can handle many different cryptographic primitives, including shared- and public-key cryptography (encryption and signatures), hash functions, and Diffie-Hellman key agreements, specified both as rewrite rules or as equations. It can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol (even in parallel) and an unbounded message space. This result has been obtained thanks to some well-chosen approximations. This means that the verifier can give false attacks, but if it claims that the protocol satisfies some property, then the property is actually satisfied. With Andreas Podelski, we have shown that the considered resolution algorithm terminates on a large class of protocols (the so-called ”tagged” protocols, FoSSaCS’03 and TCS). With Xavier Allamigeon, we have implemented attack reconstruction: when the tool cannot prove a property, it tries to reconstruct an attack, that is, an execution trace of the protocol that falsifies the desired property (CSFW’05). This verifier can prove the following properties: secrecy (the adversary cannot obtain the secret, CSFW’01), authentication (SAS’02) and more generally correspondence properties (SAS’03, with Martín Abadi), strong secrecy (the adversary does not see the difference when the value of the secret changes, Oakland’04), equivalences between processes that differ only by terms (LICS’05 with Martín Abadi and Cédric Fournet)
Keywords for this software
References in zbMATH (referenced in 41 articles )
Showing results 1 to 20 of 41.
Sorted by year (- Erbatur, Serdar; Marshall, Andrew M.; Ringeissen, Christophe: Computing knowledge in equational extensions of subterm convergent theories (2020)
- Chaieb, Marwa; Koscina, Mirko; Yousfi, Souheib; Lafourcade, Pascal; Robbana, Riadh: DABSTERS: a privacy preserving e-voting protocol for permissioned blockchain (2019)
- Li, Di Long; Tiu, Alwen: Combining proverif and automated theorem provers for security protocol verification (2019)
- Abadi, Martín; Blanchet, Bruno; Fournet, Cédric: The applied pi calculus, mobile values, new names, and secure communication (2018)
- Basin, David; Cremers, Cas; Meadows, Catherine: Model checking security protocols (2018)
- Wang, Weijin; Liu, Jingbin; Qin, Yu; Feng, Dengguo: Formal analysis of a TTP-free blacklistable anonymous credentials system (2018)
- Bugliesi, Michele; Calzavara, Stefano; Focardi, Riccardo: Formal methods for web security (2017)
- Bursuc, Sergiu; Johansen, Christian; Xu, Shiwei: Automated verification of dynamic root of trust protocols (2017)
- Kassem, Ali; Falcone, Yliès; Lafourcade, Pascal: Formal analysis and offline monitoring of electronic exams (2017)
- Almousa, Omar; Mödersheim, Sebastian; Viganò, Luca: Alice and Bob: reconciling formal models and implementation (2015)
- Basin, David; Keller, Michel; Radomirović, Saša; Sasse, Ralf: Alice and Bob meet equational theories (2015)
- Chen, Chen; Jia, Limin; Xu, Hao; Luo, Cheng; Zhou, Wenchao; Loo, Boon Thau: A program logic for verifying secure routing protocols (2015)
- Chothia, Tom; Smyth, Ben; Staite, Chris: Automatically checking commitment protocols in proverif without false attacks (2015) ioport
- Fan, Peiru; Zhao, Bo; Shi, Yuan; Chen, Zhihong; Ni, Mingtao: An improved vTPM-VM live migration protocol (2015) ioport
- Li, Yongjian; Pang, Jun: Formalizing provable anonymity in Isabelle/HOL (2015)
- Sattarzadeh, Behnam; Fallah, Mehran S.: Automated type-based analysis of injective agreement in the presence of compromised principals (2015)
- Bella, Giampaolo: Inductive study of confidentiality: for everyone (2014) ioport
- Bhargavan, Karthikeyan; Delignat-Lavaud, Antoine; Maffeis, Sergio: Defensive JavaScript: building and verifying secure web components (2014) ioport
- Blanchet, Bruno: Automatic verification of security protocols in the symbolic model: the verifier ProVerif (2014)
- Hoang, T. S.; McIver, A. K.; Meinicke, L.; Morgan, C. C.; Sloane, A.; Susatyo, E.: Abstractions of non-interference security: probabilistic versus possibilistic (2014)