ASPIER: An Automated Framework for Verifying Security Protocol Implementations. We present ASPIER - the first framework that combines software model checking with a standard protocol security model to automatically analyze authentication and secrecy properties of protocol implementations in C. The technical approach extends the iterative abstraction-refinement methodology for software model checking with a domain-specific protocol and symbolic attacker model. We have implemented the ASPIER tool and used it to verify authentication and secrecy properties of a part of an industrial strength protocol implementation - the handshake in OpenSSL - for configurations consisting of up to 3 servers and 3 clients. We have also implemented two distinct methods for reasoning about attacker message derivations, and evaluated them in the context of OpenSSL verification. ASPIER detected the ”version-rollback” vulnerability in OpenSSL 0.9.6c source code and successfully verified the implementation when clients and servers are only willing to run SSL 3.0.
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References in zbMATH (referenced in 5 articles )
Showing results 1 to 5 of 5.
- Avalle, Matteo; Pironti, Alfredo; Sisto, Riccardo: Formal verification of security protocol implementations: a survey (2014)
- Cadé, David; Blanchet, Bruno: Proved generation of implementations from computationally secure protocol specifications (2013)
- Blanchet, Bruno: Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models (2012)
- Jager, Tibor; Kohlar, Florian; Schäge, Sven; Schwenk, Jörg: On the security of TLS-DHE in the standard model (2012)
- Fournet, Cédric; Bhargavan, Karthikeyan; Gordon, Andrew D.: Cryptographic verification by typing for a sample protocol implementation (2011)